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Empathy and Collective Action in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
By John A. Sautter1
Economists guided by evolutionary psychology have theorized that in an iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma reciprocal behavior is a product of evolutionary design, where 
individuals are guided by an innate sense of fairness for equal outcomes.  Empathy as a 
pro-social emotion could be a key to understanding the psychological underpinnings of 
why and who tends to cooperate in a collective act.  In short, why are some individuals 
more prone to participate in collective-action? The hypothesis that a pro-social 
psychological disposition stemming from self-reported empathy will lead to group-
oriented behavior in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is tested.  Results suggest that 
an empathetic disposition does not lead to a higher rate of cooperation, but interacts with 
environmental conditioning to produce either a highly cooperative or highly 
uncooperative personality type.       
 
Introduction 
Most conceptions of the classic collective action problem imply that individuals 
have strong incentives to not cooperate in the face of a Prisoner’s Dilemma like policy 
situation (Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom, 1998).  The free-rider problem in this view applies to 
all people in society because each has an advantage to not cooperate, but to advance their 
own interests.  Consequently, groups and institutions merely form on the basis of how 
well they serve the interests and goals of their members (Olson, 1965).  In contrast to this 
rational-essentialist view it has been shown that individuals do “irrationally” cooperate in 
both a Prisoner’s Dilemma game and in real life scenarios that are parallel to it (Axelrod, 
1984; Ridley, 1996; Field, 2004). 
One of the main problems with the rational-essentialist viewpoint is that it makes 
no room for the inherent differences that are found amongst ordinary people.  Some 
individuals tend to be more other-oriented, while some individuals are more oriented 
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toward their own self-interest (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Hibbing and Alford, 2004).  
These differences should not be overlooked. Most models of political decision-making, 
whether rational choice or behavioralist, essentially prescribe to the “black box” notion of 
political cognition, where stimuli are applied to an individual and certain actions are 
produced (Green and Shapiro, 1996; Alford and Hibbing, 2004; Smith, 2005).  However, 
these basic arguments overlook the neurological structures of the brain and essentially 
suggest that they are unimportant, or in the least are merely novel bits of trivia that are 
not conducive to understanding the macro-level phenomenon that political scientists are 
accustomed to studying.  This sort of assertion is wrong on many levels.  First, 
understanding the complex motivations that lay behind the formation of preferences may 
help democratic theorists devise better institutional arrangements.  Emotions are intuitive 
value judgments that emanate from the subconscious part of the cerebral system 
(Damasio, 1994).  The investigation of the interaction of emotional or psychological 
dispositions with more accepted notions of cognition may lead to a better understanding 
of political preference formation and of the very human nature of collective action. 
This study investigates the effects of an empathetic emotional disposition in 
decision-making by utilizing the Prisoner’s Dilemma framework.  It is theorized that an 
empathetic disposition is an important guide to an individual’s decision-making process 
when faced with a collective action problem.  Evolutionary theory posits that group level 
selection has endowed humans with a propensity for cooperative behavior in the absence 
of selective incentives by equipping the human mind with pro-social emotions (Bowles 
and Gintis, 2003).  In short, individuals “do their part in society” because it makes them 
feel good.  However, some people get more satisfaction than others out of political 
participation or paying attention to civic issues. This is likely due to differences in 
behavioral traits that are genetically innate and socially conditioned (Alford and Hibbing, 
2004).  It is hypothesized here that a higher level of self reported empathy will lead to a 
more explicit demonstration of group-oriented egalitarian behavior in the iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Evolution and Empathy 
Research in behavioral psychology and neuroscience suggests an alternative 
conception of the collective action problem in human interactions to the rationalist 
model.  Instead of envisioning each individual as a rational being with merely different 
preferences from others, innate genetic and socialized personality differences are 
understood to be an ultimate cause of preferences for cooperative behavior.  In other 
words, the Olsonian free rider is not just a theoretical concept but is a personality type 
with distinct characteristics (Hibbing and Alford, 2004).  Evolution has cultivated a 
multitude of personality traits that vary amongst humans.  This phenotypic variation 
allows for selective advantages on the group level (Wilson, 2002).  Whether an individual 
is more of a rational calculator or an empathetic altruist, both would have played an 
important role in collective success in humans’ distant past. 
Geneticists and neuroscience researchers have given most of their attention to the 
sorts of personality traits and neurological conditions that result in the abnegation of 
cooperative behavior at the cost of overlooking the sorts of pro-social behavioral traits 
that positively lead to a cooperative psychological disposition (Davis, Luce and Kraus, 
1994).  Studies of autism, violent behavior and other asocial disorders indicate that 
genetic inheritance, as well as environmental conditioning, is an important determinant of 
patterns of behavior (Ebstein, Benjamin, and Belmaker, 2003; Pericak-Vance, 2003).   
Most important amongst pro-social personality traits is empathy.  Empathy can be 
defined and interpreted under the auspices of three main sub-characteristics: concern for 
others, perspective taking (also called theory of mind empathy) and personal distress, or 
the ability to have emotional reactions to others in need.  A study of 800 twin-pairs that 
compared monozygotic to dizygotic dyads estimated the combined inheritance of these 
three components of empathy to be estimated at 32% (Davis et al., 1994).  In light of this 
sort of finding and those concerning anti-social behavior, it is likely that genetic 
inheritance of behavioral traits affects the preferences that individuals form for 
cooperative social behavior. 
The study of the manner in which individuals attempt to understand and place 
themselves emotionally in the place of another is of great importance in contemplating 
how social groups and networks are motivated to carry out pro-social behavior.  Thoits 
(1989: 328) states that “empathetic role-taking emotions, or vicarious emotions, result 
from mentally placing oneself in another’s position and feeling what the other might feel 
in that situation.”  Empathy is arguably one of the most important socioemotional 
experiences because it provides the impetus and mental processes involved in “the effort 
to understand the internal mental and emotional events of other human beings” 
(Rosenberg, 1990:8).  Indeed, this sort of emotional capacity has been important to 
researchers looking at what motivates moral and pro-social actions, finding that higher 
levels of empathy tend to make individuals more likely to be morally outraged or to take 
action to prevent unjust acts (Davis, 1996; Smith-Lovin, 1995).  A heightened sense of 
morality or an active vigilance in regards to justice are exactly the sorts of behavioral 
tendencies that evolutionary theory would suggest should be present in those individuals 
with an inclination for group-orientated outcomes.  
There are three main evolutionary arguments for the development of empathy.  
First, is the well known theory of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964).  This theory posits that 
there is a selective advantage in cooperating with those who share the same genetic code, 
or at least part of it.  The empathetic bonds that are tightly woven between mother and 
child or, to a lesser degree, the general pattern of cooperation among extended families 
are both examples of how the empathetic disposition of the human species promotes kin 
advantage.  The second evolutionary theory focuses more on the interaction with those 
who are not genetically related.  Reciprocal altruism hypothesizes that the empathetic 
bonds that develop in friendships or working relationships evolved out of an iterated 
sequence of encounters where conspecifics mutually benefited from cooperation 
(Axelrod, 1984).  The proverbial “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine” line of 
reasoning summarily defines the manifestation of this sort of empathetic bond.  Finally, 
the group-selection model of human evolution posits that inter-group conflict promoted 
the adoption of empathetic characteristics because natural selection would have rewarded 
those groups that worked together well over groups that would not have contained the 
frequency of individuals with cooperative dispositions (Sober and Wilson, 1998).  It is 
probable that a combination of all three evolutionary modes contributed to the 
development of ubiquitous empathetic disposition in humans.  
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma as Collective Action 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been invoked time and again in explanation of the 
evolutionary origins of human behavior.  It represents in a simplified manner the 
continual problem of reciprocity, trust and collective action (Rapoport and Chammah, 
1965; Axelrod, 1984; Ridley, 1996; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) that is ever-present in 
iterated interactions between human beings.  This makes the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
framework ideal for a test of pro-social emotional disposition in an incentive based game 
because it is simple enough for those first exposed to it in an experimental setting to 
comprehend, yet theoretically sophisticated so as to allow a rich interpretation of the 
results.2
Many in political science have drawn upon this simple game as the basis for 
theory.  In contrast to Olson’s more traditional economic view of collective action, 
Hardin (1982) frames the free-rider problem as really an N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD) game.  Much in line with the way that evolutionary theorists suggest that reciprocal 
behavioral situations may have evolved in humans some theorists, including Palfrey and 
Rosenthal (1983) as well as Axlerod (1984), suggest that if certain conditions are met 
cooperative behavior is a predictable outcome of the PD.   
First, individuals need to have a low rate of time-preference, or in other words 
they should not discount the future too much.  The second condition is that the game 
theoretic scenario needs to be repeated several times.  This mitigates the standard one-
shot strategy of defection.  Similarly, the third condition requires there to be uncertainty 
among the players about when the game will end.  Under rational choice assumptions 
players will always defect in the final round if information is available on when the game 
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will end.  The final condition involves punishment.  If each player is capable of punishing 
other players that defect over the course of the game then an incentive structure is created 
that discourages defection.  Theoretically, these conditions work best when there is no 
central authority and agents are left to their own to decide whether to defect or cooperate.  
Table 1 Payoff matrix for standard prisoner's dilemma, where, T- temptation, P-punishment, R-
reward and S-sucker.  The following inequalities must hold: R>P, T>S, and P>S (Axelrod, 1984). 
  PLAYER II 
  Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
Cooperate (C) R, R S, T 
PLAYER I 
Defect (D) T, S P, P 
 
Altruism in the prisoner’s dilemma has been modeled in many different ways.3  
Most attempts to explain how and why people cooperate in situations when it seems as 
thought it goes against their rational interest have used game theoretic models.  Andreoni 
and Miller (1993) find that altruists even exist in the finitely repeated PD, where 
individuals are aware of when the game will end.  In their experiment they define two 
groups:  those who can build reputations for altruistic acts and those who are not able to 
build reputations because of behavioral constraints.  In the group that can not build 
reputations they find that after 200 rounds of single shot PD games there is a persistent 
pattern of cooperation that does not deteriorate.  In the other group where reputation 
building is possible individuals also tend to cooperate.  By separating the two groups 
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cooperate in this collective action situation, however it has been shown on many occasions that humans 
actually do.  For example, Dawes (1980) has shown that individuals tend to cooperate about 50% of the 
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Andreoni and Miller are able to show that reputation is not as important to altruistic 
behavior as it might be thought.  Indeed, their findings suggest that people probably have 
what they refer to as “homemade” altruistic preferences, or in other words, people tend to 
have individual dispositions making them more likely to cooperate.  






  PLAYER II 
  Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
Cooperate (C) 2,2 α30 − , β33−  
PLAYER I 
Defect (D) β30 − , α33−  1,1 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) look at the PD in an entirely different way.  Somewhat 
similar in manner to Hibbing and Alford’s (2002) notion of people as wary cooperators, 
they see individuals as being inequality averse.  People in this conception of the PD have 
an evolved inclination toward seeing equal distribution of payoffs.  Framing becomes the 
key in this case.  If players are more optimistic about the other player’s probability of 
cooperating then inequality-averse players will cooperate more often than the standard 
theoretical completely rational agent.  They present this idea as a social utility function, 
where each player calculates their payoff in regard to how that payoff relates to the other 
player’s payoff, thus making inequality-averse players conditional cooperators.   
The alpha and beta terms in the table above reflect the relative disposition for 
fairness of each player.  Under this scheme both players prefer equal outcomes, unless 
one of the players acts unfairly: the further the outcome from the equal pay-off, the more 
guilt or anger that each player will feel.  If an inequality-averse player knowingly met a 
selfish player, then they would defect because the selfish player would not likely 
reciprocate their cooperation.  Therefore, the most equal payoff for both parties, in the 
eyes of the inequality averse player, would be the Nash equilibrium outcome (P,P).  The 
inequality-averse player is not altruistic, but egalitarian.   
 
Emotion and Cooperation 
This notion of egalitarianism coincides with the way that evolutionary psychology 
theorizes that individuals have innate preferences for fairness.  Absolute outcomes are not 
as important as relative outcomes.  The process of how the game is played in relation to 
the other player becomes the most important aspect.  Both evolutionary theories of multi-
level selection and reciprocal altruism reflect this focus on relative outcomes.  In the case 
of collective action, individuals should be disposed toward equal and fair outcomes that 
reflect an innate desire to achieve what is implicitly best for the group, not for the 
individual (Fehr and Gachter, 2000).  This is in line with Hibbing and Alford’s (2002) 
notion that people are wary cooperators, who want to be neither suckers nor leeches in 
their relations to others.  Indeed, the very emotions that Fehr and Schmidt suggest are 
elicited (anger and guilt) when an individual receives or dictates what they perceive to be 
an unequal payoff are theorized to have evolved from a sort of reciprocal necessity over 
millions of years of proto-human existence.  Evolutionary pressure equipped humans 
with emotions in order to guide their decision making in the group context (Bowles and 
Gintis, 2003).  From this perspective it is not rationality per se that a researcher should be 
investigating, but the emotions that lead to intra-group rationality that are designed to 
deal with conflict and compromise.  
Empathy becomes an important element in attempting to understand this innate 
and evolved group-related behavior.  Most mammals, and certainly non-mammalian 
species, do not have the scope or breadth of complexity in emotion that humans 
demonstrate in their everyday interaction.  At the base of this emotional temperament is a 
pro-social empathetic disposition that varies from individual to individual.  As Sober and 
Wilson (1998) imply throughout their polemic, empathy is the veritable context with in 
which all choices are made.4  Indeed, McCabe et al. (2001) found that different parts of 
the brain are used when a player is competing against a computer versus another human.  
When playing against another human a large part of the pre-frontal cortex becomes 
activated, while in contrast when playing a computer only a small area in the rear of the 
brain that is used in mental calculation, like arithmetic, becomes activated.  This suggests 
that the empathetic context of another human actually provokes a completely different 
sort of “rationality” than when making decisions concerning non-human subjects.    
These findings, along with the aforementioned studies on empathy and past 
experimental work using the Prisoner’s Dilemma posed two hypotheses:   
Hypothesis I: A more robust empathetic psychological disposition will lead to higher 
rates of “punishment” or mutual defection in the face of an initial defection by another 
player.  
 
Hypothesis II: Empathy will predict more forgiving behavior in a player during a period 
when the opposing player attempts to re-establish mutual cooperation.   
 
In short, it is hypothesized that more empathy will lead to a more explicit display of 
group-oriented egalitarian behavior.  Empathy should heighten an individual’s awareness 
of being the Hibbian/Alfordian leech or sucker. 
                                                 




 A twofold experiment was undertaken to test the hypotheses suggested above.  
The first part of the experiment involved replicating a PD situation where defection and 
cooperation are hypothesized to occur.  The second part of the experiment involved 
gathering psychological information using a battery of self-reported empathy questions in 
order to measure each respondent’s empathetic disposition.  
Using 133 undergraduate students (57 females and 76 males) as participants, a 
fifteen round, three-stage game was utilized to test the hypothetical relationship between 
group-oriented behavior and empathy.  Two separate groups of undergraduates 
participated.  One group consisted of 81 students from a finance class and the other 
consisted of 52 College of Arts and Sciences students taken from a psychology and a 
political science class.  The experiment incorporated the four conditions discussed that 
should make the game conducive to cooperation.  Students made their decisions 
simultaneously with their opponent.  They were given the impression that they were 
playing another person when in reality they were playing a computer programmed to 
either cooperate or defect.  The first stage of mixed cooperation and defection by the 
computer was followed by a second stage of complete defection, which in turn was then 
followed by a final stage of complete cooperation.  The experiment allowed the 
investigator to analyze how participants reacted to the complete defection in the second 
stage, as well as complete cooperation in the third stage.  
 
Table 3 Payoff regime for proposed prisoner's dilemma experiment. Numbers indicate 
‘hypothetical dollars’. 
 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
Cooperate (C) 2,2 0,3 
Defect (D) 3,0 1,1 
 
Participants with a higher level of empathy should defect at higher rates when the 
computer defects and restore cooperation with their computer opponent to a higher 
degree than those with lower levels.  Students were not informed when the game would 
end, but were told that it would end randomly at some unknown round.  Participants 
played for extra credit.  At the beginning of the game students were told that the winner 
of the game would receive the full amount of extra credit, while the loser would only 
receive half of the amount of extra credit promised.  At the end of the game students were 
debriefed and told that no matter the outcome all students would receive the full amount 
of extra credit promised.5  The payoff regime followed the ordering presented in Table 3, 
where there is a collective benefit of 4 points, divided by both players equally to 
cooperate, but an individual incentive of 3 to defect. 
Stage 1 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 
Computer C D C C C
 
In stage one the computer was programmed to cooperate except for a single 
second round defection.  The second round defection was felt necessary in order to 
imbibe into students a sense of randomness and uncertainty that should accompany player 
another human being.  Complete cooperation followed by complete defection in the 
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second stage of the experiment it was felt might induce a feeling in the participant that 
they were playing with an artificial opponent, which would of course pollute the results.   
Stage 2 
Round 6 7 8 9 10
Computer D D D D C 
 
 In stage two of the experiment the computer was programmed to defect for four 
rounds, beginning in round six and ending in round nine.  It was during this stage that it 
was expected that a strong majority of participants would begin to consistently defect on 
their computer opponent.  However, the hypothesis for this experiment is that those with 
a higher level of empathy will defect at a higher rate than those with lower levels because 
of their group-oriented leanings.  The final cooperation in round 10 was necessary in 
order to allow a full five rounds of informed decision making by the participant during 
the next and final stage.  Cooperation in the tenth round should hypothetically begin to 
sway a participant toward mutual cooperation in the eleventh round. 
Stage 3 
Round 11 12 13 14 15
Computer C C C C C 
 
  
 The third stage in the experiment is the most interesting part.  According to 
Hibbing and Alford’s (2002) theory of humans as wary cooperators that want to be 
neither leeches (take advantage of others) nor suckers (to be taken advantage of), when 
the computer begins cooperating individuals should feel as though they are being leeches 
on a cooperative person.  If indeed empathy is motivating human participants’ guilt (as 
Fehr and Schmidt might suggest) or motivation in cooperation, then individuals with 
higher levels of empathy, should begin to establish mutual cooperation to a higher degree 
during the final stage of the experiment.   
 
Dependent Variables 
 Four dependent variables were created for regression analysis.  Respondents’ 
decisions during each round were recorded as either:  1 = cooperation, or 0 = defection.  
In each case the number of times a participant cooperated during one of the three stages 
of the game was summed.  In the first stage dependent variable, rounds 3 through 6 were 
included.  Rounds 1 and 2 were not included in this dependent variable because in this 
first stage it was felt most important to gauge responses to the second round defection, 
which would begin in round 3.  The round 6 decision was included because it was a 
decision based on the computer’s cooperative play in round five.  The second stage 
dependent variable included participants’ decisions in rounds 7 through 10, with these 
rounds being included because each corresponds to a previous round of defection by the 
computer.  As with the previous dependent variable the second stage variable summed 
participants’ decisions.   The third stage dependent variable included the summation of 
each participant’s decisions during rounds 11 through 15.   Finally, a dependent variable 
was created that summed up responses for the entire game so that a more general picture 
of how empathy and cooperation may have interacted on a larger level. 
 
Independent Variables. 
 Independent variables used in regression analysis included age, gender, income, 
population of hometown, race and grade point average.  It was felt necessary to control 
for these differences in socioeconomic status in order to isolate the effects of empathy.  
As Schieman and Van Gundy (2000) show, empathy is a context specific phenomenon 
that is particular to one’s socioeconomic status.6  By documenting the relationship 
between education, age, income and gender over an entire community, they are able to 
demonstrate that empathy levels are relative to one’s social position.  For instance, 
Shieman and Van Gundy present evidence that empathy tends to decrease with age, but 
that increases in higher education, income and by being female can mitigate this general 
trend. If these factors were not taken into account it would lead to a misguided analysis of 
the role that a particular individual’s relative level of empathy plays in their decision-
making process.  Therefore, controlling for these differences allows for a statistical 
analysis that looks for relative rates of empathy for an individual in their socioeconomic 
group.  Factor analysis was used to create a factor score of empathy for each participant 
from the eight empathy questions that were asked in the post-experiment questionnaire.  
These are presented in Table 4 with their respective factor loadings.7   Empathy questions 
were recorded on a seven point Likert scale.  Items were coded in a manner such that 
higher scores reflect more empathy.  
Respondents’ round one decision to cooperate or defect was also used as an 
independent predictor.  Because this decision was made in the absence of information on 
the other player, it was taken as an indication of each participant’s general willingness to 
cooperate.8  The round one decision was also used to create an interaction term with 
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7 A reliability analysis was conducted on the responses to the empathy questions with a  
Cronbach’s alpha score of α = .853. 
8 Out of the 133 undergraduate students who participated, 79.7% cooperated on the first round  
and 20.3% defected.  
empathy.  It was felt that this interaction term would help shed light on the effects of 
empathy within the group of individuals that had a more cooperative disposition (as 




 The experimental results are presented below in a statistical appendix.  Two types 
of regression analysis were used in examining the data.  The first consisted of a standard 
ordinary least squares regression.  The second type used was a tobit regression model.  
Tobit (0,X) estimation models were used because of the truncated nature of each of the 
dependent variables.  This statistical methodology can control for the two different types 
of theoretical participants in the experiment: those that defect all of the time (or, 0 
cooperation) and those that cooperate to varying degrees (or, X cooperation).   
The statistical analysis proceeded in three main parts.  First, an analysis of each 
dependent variable with both regression methods was used to look at empathy when 
controlling for socioeconomic status and a participant’s round one decision.  Next, an 
examination of each dependent variable with both types of regressions was completed 
with the empathy-round one interaction term in each model.  Finally, significance of 
difference in means tests were used to investigate how mean differences of empathy 
varied in each round in regards to those who cooperated and those who defected.   
 The statistical analysis of the first stage in regards to empathy is presented in 
Tables 5 and 6.  The dependent variable in this case is the summation of cooperation 
from rounds 3 through 6, or just after the first defection by the computer.  Both show 
similar results.  In the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression the first thing one should 
notice is that the F - statistic, or model fit test, is not significant, meaning that little to 
none of the variance present in the dependent variable is being explained by the 
independent predictors.  What variance is explained is being predicted by the round one 
variable, which is significant at p < .01 level.  The tobit model is not much different with 
the round one variable being the only significant predictor with significance at the p < .01 
level.  Though a tobit does not report a model fit test, it does report an adjusted R-square 
measure that is equal to .01 in this regression, meaning that with this model as well there 
is little to no variance being explained.  However, when one compares the unstandardized 
beta coefficient for the round one variable of the OLS regression to the tobit, it is 
important to note that the coefficient is larger in the tobit model.  This suggests that the 
theoretical difference between non-cooperators and partial cooperators, which is taken 
into account in the tobit because of the (0,X) treatment of the dependent variable, is 
manifest in the results.  At the lower left hand corner of Table 6, as well with all other 
tobit estimation tables, the number of complete non-cooperators is presented as “Left 
censored observations,” showing here that 26 participants did not cooperate once during 
this period.   
  The second stage results are presented in Tables 7 and 8.  The dependent variable 
in both estimations is the summation of cooperative decisions between rounds 7 through 
10 therefore each individual has a score between zero and 4.  In both cases the empathy 
factor variable is significant at the p ≤ .10 level with a negative coefficient.  This 
indicates that as empathy increased participants were more likely to defect when the 
computer was defecting.  Similar to the empathy variable, grade point average is also 
significant at the p < .10 level with a negative coefficient.  The gender variable is 
positively correlated and significant at the p < .05 level, showing that as the computer 
began consistently defecting women were more likely to cooperate than men.  Again as 
in the stage one analysis the round one variable is very significant and positively 
correlated with cooperation.  The tobit model once again shows stronger results in that 
the unstandardized coefficients on each significant variable are larger and the p-values 
are lower, most likely reflecting the differences between complete and partial non-
cooperation. 
 Stage III results are present in Tables 9 and 10.  The OLS estimation only has the 
round one predictor as a significant variable at the p < .0001 level.  The tobit model 
renders only a slightly different picture with the addition of income as a significant 
predictor at the p < .10 level with a negative coefficient indicating that as participant’s 
family income increased they were less likely to cooperate in the final rounds.  Empathy 
is not significant in either of the estimations.   
The final two tables, 11 and 12, in this first part of the statistical analysis uses a 
summation of all cooperative decisions over the entire experiment as a dependent 
variable.  Not surprisingly, the round one predictor is a very strong indication that 
participants would cooperate during the entire experiment.  However, in these regressions 
no other independent predictors, including empathy, were significant.   
The next part of the statistical analysis involved creating an interaction term 
between empathy and round one.  As discussed earlier, it was important to test the 
significance of empathy within the group of individuals that cooperated on the first 
round.  These results appear in Tables 13 through 20.  These results can be generalized by 
saying that no relationship exists between cooperation in the various stages and the 
interaction of empathy with a round one cooperative decision.  Indeed, as one will notice 
by perusing the estimations in this second part, the F – statistics on the OLS regressions 
and the R-square on the tobits are very low and not significant, indicating that the 
addition of the round one/empathy interaction is actually decreasing the ability of the 
model to predict the variance in each dependent variable. 
Finally, Table 21 contains the significance of difference in means between those 
who cooperated and those who defected in each round.  In each case Group 1 is 
composed of those that defected while Group 2 consists of those that cooperated in each 
round.  Looking at the far right side of the table the numbers in the Group 1 Total 
(defectors) and Group 2 Total (cooperators) columns are the amount of participants that 
defected or cooperated in each round, respectively.  There is a general pattern that 
follows the hypothesized reactions to the computer’s decisions.  In rounds 1 and 2 Group 
2 is larger than Group 1, with more individuals cooperating with the computer in each 
round.  However, notice that after the computer defects in round 2 there is a move toward 
greater defection during rounds 3 through 6 (Stage I).  This defection becomes 
heightened during rounds 7 through 10 (Stage II) when the computer opponent is 
consistently defecting on the human player.  In the final rounds 11 through 15 (Stage III) 
there is a tendency to move toward cooperation with the Group 2 Total being greater than 
the Group 1 Total once again. 
The results are relatively mixed.  The first hypothesis presented was that empathy 
would be a significant predictor of participants’ defection in the second stage of the 
experiment.  In both the OLS and tobit estimations a participant’s empathetic disposition 
was a significant predictor of defection in retaliation to the opposing player’s second 
stage defections.  For these two analyses, the null hypothesis can be rejected.  Empathy 
was a factor. 
 The second hypothesis that an empathetic disposition would lead to higher rates 
of re-cooperation in the final stage of the experiment was flat out wrong.  A null result 
occurred.  Indeed, in looking closely at each of the third stage regression results one 
should note that the empathy factor variable carries a negative coefficient.  Though not 
significant in any of the regressions, it indicates that even marginal levels of empathy led 
to more defection in the final rounds of the experiment.  Truly, empathy was not a 
facilitator of restoring cooperation after reciprocal trust had been broken. 
 
Empathy and the J-curve of Cooperation  
Initially it was thought that because trust was broken during the second stage 
defections those with higher levels of empathy might have been more likely to feel as 
though they were playing with an unfair opponent who did not deserve to be cooperated 
with in the final stages, thus the null result for the second hypothesis.  In this case it 
seemed that the preference for relative versus absolute outcomes when dealing with 
others likely promulgated more defection in the final stage of the experiment because 
“empathists,” those with higher levels of empathy, were probably still upset about the 
consistent defection during the second stage.  However, on closer examination of the 
entire experiment a completely different picture emerges on the role that empathy played 
as a facilitator of cooperation and defection. 
 In Figure 1 the number of individuals is compared with the number of times they 
cooperated during the entire experiment.  The normal distribution of cooperative 
decisions over the course of the game is near ideal.  Participants could have cooperated 
anywhere from 0 to 15 times (giving a total of sixteen possible sums) during the course of 
the experiment and the mean of this distribution is 7.78, or nearly 8 which would be the 
mean of a perfectly normal distribution across this sample of students.  Indeed, in Figure 
4 a line graph is shown with a single distinctive peak reflecting the normal distribution of 
the sample. 
 What is intriguing is the display of the mean factor score of empathy across this 
same sample shown in Figure 2.  There is a bimodal distribution (two peaks) across the 
sample in regards to the mean factor score of empathy per incidences of cooperation 
during the experiment.  Those individuals at the extremes of the distribution have on 
average very low empathy scores.  Those in the middle of the distribution tended have 
higher scores than those in the tails, but on average were far lower than the individuals 
present in either peak, where the empathy scores were the highest.  This indicates that 
there is a possible “J-curve” to empathy, or that high levels of empathy can produce 
either more defection or more cooperation depending on the individual, but that 
participants with a median level of empathy will converge toward cooperating about 50 
percent of the time.9   
In order to test this new J-curve hypothesis two significance of the difference in 
means tests were used in order to confirm what seemed evident in the graphs.  The first 
                                                 
9 The J-curve concept is aptly illustrated by a study regarding testosterone and depression.  It has been 
found that testosterone levels conform to a J-curve in regards to depression in men (Booth, Johnson and 
Granger, 1999) where extremely high and low levels of testosterone correlate with depression while median 
levels of testosterone (which encompasses a majority of males) correlates with lower rates of depression. 
test was aimed at investigating whether the individuals in the extreme tails of the 
distribution were in fact much lower on average than the rest of the sample.  In most 
respects it would make intuitive sense that participants that cooperated either all of the 
time (15 cooperative decisions) or nearly all of the time (14 cooperative decisions) and 
those that defected all of the time (0 cooperative decisions) or nearly all of the time (1 
cooperative decision) would have lower mean empathy scores because they were not 
actually engaging their opponent and did not care what the other player did.  Whether 
their opponent defected or cooperated these individuals were indifferent.  In this respect 
these participants can be seen as having adopted a strategy to use throughout the entire 
game and were not concerned about their opponent’s fair or unfair actions, or in other 
words: egalitarian outcomes and behavior were not a factor in their decision making.  
Table 21 contains the results from a comparison of the mean score of empathy between 
these outliers and the rest of the sample.  The “All Round-Tails” variable was coded to 
create two groups of participants out of the total distribution of cooperative decisions, 
with Group 1 being those in the tails of the distribution and Group 2 being every other 
participant.  The difference in means was significant at the p < .05 level, indicating that 
those participants who cooperated or defected to the extreme actually had significantly 
lower levels of empathy. 
The next test examined whether the mean level of empathy in participants in the 
empathy peaks of the distribution of cooperation did in fact have a statistically significant 
higher mean level of empathy than other players in the sample.  Table 21 presents the 
results of this analysis under the variable name “All Round Bimodal,” where individuals 
in the peaks were coded different than other participants.  The test reveals that the mean 
empathy levels are significant at the p < .05 level, showing that the J-curve interpretation 
of cooperation during the experiment is supported.   
In order to further investigate this relationship a binary probit regression was used 
to estimate the difference in empathy between the two groups when controlling for each 
independent variable used in previous regression models, where Group 1 = 0 (those 
present in the tails and in the center of the distribution) and Group 2 = 1 (those present in 
either of the bimodal peaks).  The results appear in Table 22.  The empathy factor 
variable is significant at the p < .05 level and positive.  The probit estimation eliminates 
the possibility that another socioeconomic factor (like gender, age or race) that correlates 
with empathy could be causing the unique distribution of individuals with higher rates of 
empathy.   
There were 36 participants that inhabited the bimodal high empathy peaks, with 
18 participants in the less cooperative peak and 18 individuals in the more cooperative 
peak of the bimodal distribution, see Figures 5.  In other words, 50% of those with high 
empathy levels that did not converge toward the median range of cooperation tended to 
be the highest defectors.  Furthermore, recall that each decision was made in anonymity, 
where the identity of participants was unknown and a fear of personal reputation effects 
should not have affected their decisions. 
Finally, an analysis of the possible differences between individuals with high 
levels of empathy residing in the more cooperative empathy peak and the less cooperative 
empathy peak was conducted.  All possible variables that were gathered from the survey 
after the experiment were investigated.  The size of a participant’s home town and the 
level of their family income were found to be statistically significant predictors.  Figures 
7 and 8 show the results of the difference of means test for each variable.  Essentially, 
those individuals with high levels of empathy present in the “more cooperative peak” 
tended to have been raised in smaller towns and come from families with a relatively 
lower level of income.  In contrast, individuals present in the “less cooperative peak” 
were raised in a large city environment and came from families with a relatively higher 
level of income. 
The results of this experiment suggest social conditioning could be very important 
to the manner in which an empathetic disposition manifests itself in social decision 
making.  Being from a larger urban area during an individual’s childhood would likely 
diminish the reputation effects of continued social interaction.  In a large city it is less 
likely that an individual would cross paths with the same person again and again in an 
iterative manner where one’s reputation would affect social interaction.  On the other 
hand, growing up in a small town diminishes anonymity.  Individuals would place a 
stronger emphasis on initial interactions because the likelihood of encountering the same 
person repeatedly is much greater due to a lower population density.  Thus, these two 
opposite social environments may interact with high levels of empathy to create different 
other-regarding tendencies.   
 
Conclusion 
 Higher rates of empathy tended to have two contrary effects by either making an 
individual more likely to defect or more likely to cooperate, but not to converge toward 
the median level of cooperation as the majority of participants in this experiment.  The 
line graph presented in Figure 5 demonstrates the J-curve phenomenon with empathy and 
cooperation over the entire experiment.  Then, in Figure 6 the outliers (those who either 
always cooperated or defected) have been removed in order to isolate the J-curve.  
Indeed, these outliers present an interesting finding in that their low levels of empathy 
and lack of concern as to the decisions being made by others suggests that a shallow 
empathetic disposition leads to an absence of concern for outcomes relative to the other 
individual.  However, the bipolar nature of cooperation that a high level of empathy leads 
to indicates a more complex, non-linear relationship between empathy and cooperation.  
Contrary to the hypotheses originally being tested, it is not that empathy has a simple 
positive linear relationship with a desire for egalitarian outcomes. Rather, an empathetic 
emotional disposition likely cultivates a sensitivity to social decisions, which depending 
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Table 4 Empathy Scale Items and Factor Analysis Loadings.10   
  Empathy Question Loading 
1. I make people feel welcome. .758 
2. I anticipate the needs of others. .626 
3. I love to help others. .769 
4. I am concerned about others. .558 
5. I have a good word for everyone. .628 
6. I am sensitive to the feelings of others. .760 
7. I make people feel comfortable. .798 
8. I take time for others. .785 
 
                                                 
10 Questions taken from Goldberg, L.R.  1999.  “A Broad-Bandwidth, Public-Domain, Personality 
Inventory Measuring the Lower-Level Facets of Several Five-Factor Models.”  University of 
Oregon and Oregon Research Institute, 1999.  In Mervielde, I. Deary, I., De Fruyt, F.  & 
Ostendorf, F. (Eds.), Pers. Psychology in Europe 7: 7-28. Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg 
University Press. 
Table 5 OLS Regression of Stage I Responses. 
OLS Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage I Responses 
 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Beta (Stand) p-value 
Constant 1.011 1.438  .483 
Round One .600 .218 .249 .007 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) .019 .190 .010 .919 
Age -.002 .042 -.004 .964 
Income  -.038 .106 -.035 .722 
Population of Home -.040 .070 -.057 .571 
Race (0=W, 1=E) -.155 .347 -.043 .656 
Grade Point Avg. -.017 .224 -.007 .939 
Empathy .004 .015 .024 .801 
     
F 1.320   .240 
Adj. R-squ. .02    
N 126    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the First Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 3 thru 6.  Analysis was run on SPSS 12. 
 
 
Table 6 Tobit Regression of Stage I Responses. 
Tobit Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage I Responses 
 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z-Score p-value 
Constant 0.975437 1.757248 0.555094 0.5788 
Round One 0.775919 0.267043 2.905592 0.0037 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) 0.096752 0.227919 0.424501 0.6712 
Age -0.009851 0.051094 -0.192795 0.8471 
Income  -0.070237 0.126442 -0.555483 0.5786 
Population of Home -0.036598 0.083885 -0.436286 0.6626 
Race (0=W, 1=E) -0.228168 0.416176 -0.548248 0.5835 
Grade Point Avg. -0.065086 0.266867 -0.243890 0.8073 
Empathy 0.006712 0.017863 0.375740 0.7071 
     
Adj. R-squ. .01    
N 127    
Left censored obs 26    
Uncensored obs 101    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the First Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 3 thru 6.  Analysis was run on Eviews 5. 
 
Table 7 OLS Regression of Stage II Responses. 
OLS Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage II Responses 
 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Beta (Stand) p-value 
Constant 3.890 1.651  .020 
Round One 1.043 .250 .350 .000 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) .445 .219 .184 .044 
Age .002 .048 .003 .973 
Income  -.039 .122 -.029 .750 
Population of Home -.102 .081 -.117 .211 
Race (0=W, 1=E) -.015 .398 -.003 .970 
Grade Point Avg. -.444 .257 -.147 .087 
Empathy -.028 .017 -.144 .100 
     
F 3.995   .000 
Adj. R-squ. .16    
N 126    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the Second Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 7 thru 10.  Analysis was run on SPSS 12. 
 
Table 8 Tobit Regression of Stage II Responses. 
Tobit Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage II Responses 
 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z-Score p-value 
Constant 4.119769 1.937391 2.126452 0.0335 
Round One 1.385977 0.309427 4.479168 0.0000 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) 0.582697 0.258025 2.258293 0.0239 
Age 0.001580 0.055782 0.028324 0.9774 
Income  -0.043706 0.143861 -0.303811 0.7613 
Population of Home -0.127309 0.094398 -1.348640 0.1775 
Race (0=W, 1=E) 0.100366 0.461998 0.217244 0.8280 
Grade Point Avg. -0.522350 0.304390 -1.716055 0.0862 
Empathy -0.036118 0.020234 -1.785069 0.0743 
     
Adj. R-squ. .15    
N 127    
Left censored obs 25    
Uncensored obs 102    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the First Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 7 thru 10.  Analysis was run on Eviews 5. 
 
Table 9 OLS Regression of Stage III Responses. 
OLS Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage III Responses 
 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Beta (Stand) p-value 
Constant 2.037 2.345  .387 
Round One 1.425 .355 .351 .000 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) .078 .310 .024 .802 
Age .002 .068 .002 .979 
Income  -.267 .173 -.147 .126 
Population of Home .112 .115 .095 .332 
Race (0=W, 1=E) .072 .565 .012 .899 
Grade Point Avg. .278 .365 .068 .447 
Empathy -.024 .024 -.089 .328 
     
F 2.505   .015 
Adj. R-squ. .087    
N 126    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the Third Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 11 thru 15.  Analysis was run on SPSS 12. 
 
Table 10 Tobit Regression of Stage III Responses. 
Tobit Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage III Responses 
 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z-Score p-value 
Constant 1.548432 2.572608 0.601892 0.5472 
Round One 1.698831 0.397330 4.275619 0.0000 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) 0.120276 0.339581 0.354190 0.7232 
Age 0.013140 0.074392 0.176636 0.8598 
Income  -0.318235 0.190232 -1.672879 0.0944 
Population of Home 0.118166 0.124831 0.946609 0.3438 
Race (0=W, 1=E) 0.087511 0.618233 0.141550 0.8874 
Grade Point Avg. 0.332231 0.399217 0.832207 0.4053 
Empathy -0.028035 0.026623 -1.053036 0.2923 
     
Adj. R-squ. .08    
N 127    
Left censored obs 16    
Uncensored obs 111    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the First Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 11 thru 15.  Analysis was run on Eviews 5. 
 
Table 11 OLS Regression of All Responses. 
OLS Regression – Dependent Variable: All Responses 
 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Beta (Stand) p-value 
Constant 7.291 4.218  .087 
Round One 4.763 .639 .567 .000 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) .459 .558 .067 .412 
Age -.009 .123 -.006 .942 
Income  -.491 .311 -.130 .118 
Population of Home .043 .206 .018 .836 
Race (0=W, 1=E) .220 1.017 .018 .829 
Grade Point Avg. -.053 .657 -.006 .935 
Empathy -.046 .044 -.083 .291 
     
F 8.016   .000 
Adj. R-squ. .308    
N 126    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during every round of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 1 thru 15.  Analysis was run on SPSS 12. 
 
Table 12 Tobit Regression of All Responses. 
Tobit Regression – Dependent Variable: All Responses 
 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z-Score p-value 
Constant 7.253665 4.161975 1.742842 0.0814 
Round One 4.909473 0.632493 7.762095 0.0000 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) 0.509352 0.549863 0.926325 0.3543 
Age -0.007821 0.120775 -0.064754 0.9484 
Income  -0.498216 0.306760 -1.624123 0.1043 
Population of Home 0.043881 0.203092 0.216067 0.8289 
Race (0=W, 1=E) 0.245790 0.999937 0.245806 0.8058 
Grade Point Avg. -0.094287 0.647523 -0.145611 0.8842 
Empathy -0.046667 0.043264 -1.078648 0.2807 
     
Adj. R-squ. .30    
N 127    
Left censored obs 3    
Uncensored obs 124    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during every round of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 1 thru 15.  Analysis was run on Eviews 5. 
 
Table 13 OLS Regression of Stage I Responses with Interaction Term. 
OLS Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage I Responses 
With Interaction Term 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Beta (Stand) p-value 
Constant -.142 2.026  .944 
Round One 2.076 1.836 .862 .261 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) .022 .191 .011 .907 
Age -.002 .042 -.004 .965 
Income  -.043 .107 -.040 .687 
Population of Home -.039 .071 -.055 .584 
Race (0=W, 1=E) -.163 .347 -.045 .641 
Grade Point Avg. -.045 .227 -.018 .844 
Empathy .032 .038 .199 .401 
Empathy*Round 1 -.033 .041 -.660 .420 
     
F 1.243   .276 
Adj. R-squ. .02    
N 126    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the First Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 3 thru 6.  Analysis was run on SPSS 12. 
Table 14 Tobit Regression of Stage I Responses with Interaction Term. 
Tobit Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage I Responses 
With Interaction Term 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z-Score p-value 
Constant -1.192688 2.581300 -0.462049 0.6440 
Round One 3.439444 2.327283 1.477880 0.1394 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) 0.096090 0.227277 0.422789 0.6724 
Age -0.009397 0.050948 -0.184437 0.8537 
Income  -0.075738 0.126114 -0.600551 0.5481 
Population of Home -0.035588 0.083649 -0.425439 0.6705 
Race (0=W, 1=E) -0.238463 0.415503 -0.573915 0.5660 
Grade Point Avg. -0.107600 0.268395 -0.400901 0.6885 
Empathy 0.058302 0.048284 1.207483 0.2272 
Empathy*Round 1 -0.059180 0.051277 -1.154127 0.2484 
     
Adj. R-squ. .01    
N 127    
Left censored obs 26    
Uncensored obs 101    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the First Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 3 thru 6.  Analysis was run on Eviews 5. 
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Table 15 OLS Regression of Stage II Responses with Interaction Term. 
OLS Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage II Responses 
With Interaction Term 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Beta (Stand) p-value 
Constant 3.514 2.332  .135 
Round One 1.524 2.114 .511 .472 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) .446 .220 .184 .044 
Age .002 .048 .003 .973 
Income  -.041 .123 -.030 .741 
Population of Home -.101 .081 -.117 .215 
Race (0=W, 1=E) -.018 .400 -.004 .965 
Grade Point Avg. -.453 .261 -.150 .086 
Empathy -.019 .044 -.097 .658 
Empathy*Round 1 -.011 .047 -.173 .819 
     
F 3.528   .001 
Adj. R-squ. .153    
N 126    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the Second Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 7 thru 10.  Analysis was run on SPSS 12. 
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Table 16 Tobit Regression of Stage II Responses with Interaction Term. 
Tobit Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage II Responses 
With Interaction Term 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z-Score p-value 
Constant 4.002937 2.864423 1.397467 0.1623 
Round One 1.529141 2.604077 0.587211 0.5571 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) 0.582804 0.258012 2.258828 0.0239 
Age 0.001577 0.055780 0.028265 0.9775 
Income  -0.044145 0.144070 -0.306417 0.7593 
Population of Home -0.127082 0.094484 -1.345012 0.1786 
Race (0=W, 1=E) 0.099780 0.462096 0.215929 0.8290 
Grade Point Avg. -0.524549 0.306952 -1.708894 0.0875 
Empathy -0.033317 0.054484 -0.611498 0.5409 
Empathy*Round 1 -0.003205 0.057884 -0.055375 0.9558 
     
Adj. R-squ. .14    
N 127    
Left censored obs 25    
Uncensored obs 102    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the First Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 7 thru 10.  Analysis was run on Eviews 5. 
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Table 17 OLS Regression of Stage III Responses with Interaction Term. 
OLS Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage III Responses 
With Interaction Term 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Beta (Stand) p-value 
Constant 3.459 3.307  .298 
Round One -.395 2.997 -.097 .895 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) .074 .311 .022 .812 
Age .002 .068 .002 .980 
Income  -.261 .174 -.143 .136 
Population of Home .110 .115 .093 .340 
Race (0=W, 1=E) .081 .567 .013 .886 
Grade Point Avg. .313 .370 .076 .400 
Empathy -.059 .062 -.217 .344 
Empathy*Round 1 .041 .066 .482 .542 
     
F 2.256   .023 
Adj. R-squ. .082    
N 126    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the Third Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 11 thru 15.  Analysis was run on SPSS 12. 
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Table 18 Tobit Regression of Stage III Responses with Interaction Term. 
Tobit Regression – Dependent Variable: Stage III Responses 
With Interaction Term 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z-Score p-value 
Constant 3.107997 3.670148 0.846832 0.3971 
Round One -0.256082 3.313475 -0.077285 0.9384 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) 0.118041 0.339052 0.348149 0.7277 
Age 0.013197 0.074269 0.177695 0.8590 
Income  -0.312923 0.190114 -1.645975 0.0998 
Population of Home 0.116654 0.124645 0.935885 0.3493 
Race (0=W, 1=E) 0.095651 0.617211 0.154973 0.8768 
Grade Point Avg. 0.364442 0.402315 0.905862 0.3650 
Empathy -0.065647 0.068681 -0.955821 0.3392 
Empathy*Round 1 0.043653 0.073497 0.593940 0.5526 
     
Adj. R-squ. .01    
N 127    
Left censored obs 16    
Uncensored obs 111    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during the First Stage of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 11 thru 15.  Analysis was run on Eviews 5. 
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Table 19 OLS Regression of All Responses with Interaction Term. 
OLS Regression – Dependent Variable: All Responses 
With Interaction Term 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Beta (Stand) p-value 
Constant 6.476 5.957  .279 
Round One 5.806 5.399 .691 .284 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) .461 .561 .068 .412 
Age -.009 .123 -.006 .942 
Income  -.494 .313 -.131 .117 
Population of Home .044 .207 .018 .833 
Race (0=W, 1=E) .215 1.021 .017 .834 
Grade Point Avg. -.073 .667 -.009 .913 
Empathy -.027 .111 -.048 .811 
Empathy*Round 1 -.023 .120 -.134 .846 
     
F 7.072   .000 
Adj. R-squ. .303    
N 126    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during every round of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 1 thru 15.  Analysis was run on SPSS 12. 
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Table 20 Tobit Regression of All Responses with Interaction Term. 
Tobit Regression – Dependent Variable: All Responses 
With Interaction Term 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z-Score p-value 
Constant 6.154972 5.935778 1.036928 0.2998 
Round One 6.294812 5.373439 1.171468 0.2414 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) 0.511410 0.549817 0.930146 0.3523 
Age -0.007721 0.120757 -0.063941 0.9490 
Income  -0.502217 0.307091 -1.635402 0.1020 
Population of Home 0.044868 0.203099 0.220915 0.8252 
Race (0=W, 1=E) 0.239887 1.000063 0.239872 0.8104 
Grade Point Avg. -0.118483 0.654079 -0.181144 0.8563 
Empathy -0.020123 0.111019 -0.181256 0.8562 
Empathy*Round 1 -0.030913 0.119061 -0.259640 0.7951 
     
Adj. R-squ. .01    
N 127    
Left censored obs 3    
Uncensored obs 124    
Dependent variable is a summation of a participant’s responses during every round of the experiment, 
including responses during rounds 1 thru 15.  Analysis was run on Eviews 5. 
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Table 21 Independence of Means Tests on Empathy Factor Score and Decision Making.  
Independence of Means Tests on Empathy Factor Score and Decision 
Making 
 








Round 1 -.2006 .0511 .134 27 106 
Round 2 -.0845 .0509 .435 50 83 
Round 3 .0285 -.0273 .748 65 68 
Round 4 -.0293 .0403 .705 77 56 
Round 5 -.0613 .0793 .423 75 58 
Round 6 -.0577 .0642 .257 70 63 
Round 7 .0333 -.0370 .688 70 63 
Round 8 .0433 -.0939 .459 91 42 
Round 9 -.0746 .1280 .261 84 49 
Round 10 .0530 -.0538 .541 67 66 
Round 11 .0725 -.0736 .402 67 66 
Round 12 -.0744 .0575 .444 58 75 
Round 13 -.0253 .0152 .818 50 83 
Round 14 .0682 -.0451 .419 53 80 
Round 15 .0450 -.0317 .659 55 78 
All Round-Tails -.4956 .0677 .034 16 117 
All Round 
Bimodal 
.3233 -.1341 .021 36 98 
Each round is presented above, with Group 1 = 0, or defection, and Group 2 = 1, or 
cooperation in PD game.  Group Means are the mean level of Empathy Factor scores for 
each group.  “All Round-Tails” represents difference in mean level of empathy between 
those in the extreme tails of cooperation (Group 1) during all rounds and all other 
participants (Group 2).  “All Round Bimodal” represents difference in mean level of 
empathy between those with rates of cooperation in either peak (Group 1) of the bi-modal 
empathy distribution and all other participants (Group 2).   In all cases Group 1 and Group 
2 summed together total 133 participants.  Analysis was run on SPSS 12. 
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Table 22 Binary Probit Regression of All Round Bimodal. 
Binary Probit Regression – Dependent Variable: All Round Bimodal 
 
Variables B (Unstand) S.E. Z-Score p-value 
Constant 0.395278 1.802669 0.219274 0.8264 
Round One -0.522978 0.301229 -1.736147 0.0825 
Gender (0=M, 1=F) 0.169787 0.268907 0.631398 0.5278 
Age 0.015265 0.058234 0.262126 0.7932 
Income  -0.014955 0.148860 -0.100461 0.9200 
Population of Home -0.029947 0.102471 -0.292251 0.7701 
Race (0=W, 1=E) -0.002640 0.470379 -0.005613 0.9955 
Grade Point Avg. -0.256563 0.320598 -0.800263 0.4236 
Empathy 0.305954 0.138090 2.215611 0.0267 
     
McFadden R-squ. .07    
N 127    
Obs with Dep=0 92    
Obs with Dep=1 35    
Dependent variable is a binary (0,1) variable.  Participants with incidences of cooperation throughout the 
entire experiment that numbered: 2, 3, 4, 5; as well as: 11, 12, 13; were coded as “1”.  All other participants 
were coded as “0”.  Analysis was run on Eviews 5. 
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Std. Dev. = 3.43567
N = 133
Number of Participants Per Incidences of Cooperation
 
Figure 1 Number of Participants per Incidences of Cooperation. 
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Figure 2  Mean Score of Empathy Factor per Incidences of Cooperation During Experiment. 
 
 50
 .00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 13.00 14.00 15.00








Figure 3 Number of Participants per Incidences of Cooperation with bimodal areas of high 
empathy darkened.  Y-axis is number of participants. 
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Figure 5  Mean Score of Empathy per Incidence of Cooperation During Entire Experiment.  




Figure 6 Mean Score of Empathy per Incidence of Cooperation During Entire Experiment.   
Each data point represents the mean value of the two incidences of cooperation indicated on 
the X-axis.  No cooperation and one cooperative decision, as well as complete cooperation 





Figure 7 Difference of Means Test Comparing Size of Home Town for Participants Falling into the 
"Less Cooperative Empathy" Peak and those in the "Most Cooperative Empathy" Peak.   Where, 1= 
Rural Area; 2= Village (Population of Less Than 1,000); 3= Town (From 1,000 to 10,000); 4= City 
(10,000 – 100,000); 5= Large City (Great than 100,000).  Mean for Entire Sample: 3.73 (N=133). 
 
Bimodal Empathy Peaks (N=36) 
t = 3.32,  p < .01 
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Figure 8 Difference of Means Test Comparing Size of Family Income for Participants Falling into the 
"Less Cooperative Empathy" Peak and those in the "Most Cooperative Empathy" Peak.   Where, 1= 
Less than $40,000; 2=$40,000 - $80,000; 3=$80,000 - $120,000; 4= Greater than $120,000. 
Mean for Entire Sample: 2.32 (N=133). 
 
Bimodal Empathy Peaks (N=36) 













































































































Less Coop Peak (N=18)
More Coop Peak (N=18)
Total (N=133)
Chart 1 Comparison of Percentage Cooperating in Each Round Between High Empathy Peaks and 
Total.  Y-axis: Percent of group cooperating per round.  X-axis: Round and the Previous Play of the 
computer in the preceding round, C=Cooperation & D=Defection. 
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